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Aggregate Litigation & All That We Do
Not Know
Brooke D. Coleman*
A good article raises a normative question, wrestles with it, and ultimately
answers it. A great article also inspires the reader to cogitate. Briana
Rosenbaum's The Rico Trend in Class Action Warfare, is undoubtedly a great
article. The article addresses a complex and interesting issue-the use of the
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statute to
sanction attorneys-while also inspiring thought about other fascinating
questions. My Response to the article will focus on one such question: What
do we really know about aggregate litigation?2
* William C. Oltman Professor of Teaching Excellence & Associate Professor of Law,
Seattle University School of Law.
1. Briana Lynn Rosenbaum, The RICO Trend in Class Action Warfare, 102 IowA L. REv. 165
(2016).
2. For the purpose of this discussion, I will use the term aggregate litigation to refer to class
actions, mass actions, and multidistrict litigation.
AGGREGATE LITIGATION
Legal empirical work is more fashionable than ever,3 and this is certainly
true in the field of civil procedure.4 Yet, there are some aspects of civil
litigation and civil procedure that appear to be empirically understudied.
Perhaps there is a lack of interest in the specific rule or doctrine such that it
is overlooked. Perhaps there is no way of knowing what we need to know. Or,
perhaps even if we discovered what we wanted to know, it would not overcome
our own biases and perceptions.
Aggregate litigation is a hotbed of scholarly activity, so surely there is an
interest in how it really works.5 This leaves us with the latter two justifications.
I argue both apply. First, while there is much we would like to know about
aggregate litigation, some of it-due to structural and institutional
challenges-is simply unknowable.6 Second, even if empirical work could
3. See generally Daniel E. Ho & Larry Kramer, Introduction: The Empirical Revolution in Law,
65 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1195 (2013) (introducing collection of six essays discussing the ascendance of
empirical scholarship and noting that empirical work in Stanford Law Review articles has "skyrocketed
over the decades"); Kathryn Zeiler, The Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Where Might We Go
from Here?, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 78, 78 (2016) ("The number of empirical legal studies that show up in
the pages of journals has been on the rise as empirical methods improve and researchers gain easy
access to a growing number of data sets. This addition to legal scholarship is welcome after decades of
theory's dominance."). The rise of empirical work spans a number of different schools of legal thought
and legal fields. See, e.g., 11th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (CELS), DUKE L.,
https: //law.duke.edu/ cels2016 (last visited Mar. 20, 2017) (covering topics such as "criminal law and
policy, corporate governance, judicial decision-making, intellectual property, and law and psychology");
Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods: Wisconsin Law Review Symposium and Institute for
Legal Studies Research Workshop, UNIV. Wis. L. SCH., http://law.wisc.edu/ils
/2015lawreviewsymposium/index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2017); Critical Race Theory and
Empirical Methods Conference, FORDHAM L. REV., http://fordhamlawreview.org
/symposiumcategory/critical-race-theory-and-empirical-methods-conference (last visited Mar. 20,
2017); The Relationship Between Insurance and Legal Regulation: Normative, Theoretical, and
Empirical Perspectives, U.C. IRVINE SCH. L., http://www.law.uci.edu/events/insurance-
law/symposium-2014 (last visited Mar. 20, 2017) (offering "empirical, legal, normative, theoretical,
and historical perspectives on the relationship between insurance and legal regulation").
4. For example, there was a flurry of empirical legal scholarship following the Court's
pleading decisions in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009). See generally, e.g., JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON
RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND: REPORT TO THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2011),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
motioniqbal2.pdf/$file/motioniqbal2.pdf; Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do
Twombly and Lqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U.L. REV. 553 (2010); Lonny Hoffman, Twombly
and Lqbal's Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center's Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6
FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2011); Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Lqbal's
Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603 (2012); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring
the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117 (2015); Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking
the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and lqbal on Access to Discovery, 121
YALE L.J. 2270,
2326-27 (2012).
5. See infra note 22.
6. See infra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
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provide credible answers to questions about aggregate litigation, it would not
diffuse the us-versus-them nature of the debate. At bottom, this is about our
values. One either believes in the enterprise of aggregate litigation and will
therefore find the support-theoretical or empirical-to buttress that
evaluation, or one is skeptical of aggregation and will similarly marshal
whatever evidence is available to support that viewpoint.7 It is this question-
what we know and what we do not know and whether it matters-over which
I will ruminate.
Before reaching that discussion, however, a quick summary of the article
that inspired it is instructive. Rosenbaum's article seeks to confront the
question of whether what she terms "the RICO reprisal" is a valid response to
potentially frivolous aggregate litigation.8 Ultimately, she determines that-
especially given the existing remedial structure for vexatious litigants-RICO
is an ill-fit for combatting specious claiming.9 She provides a number of
reasons: RICO was not designed or adopted with such use in mind,1o it offends
federalism values,1- may violate the Rules Enabling Act,2 and it is too strong
a weapon in this context3-think about bringing a semi-automatic weapon to
a knife fight. Yet, even if one accepts that RICO is necessary to deter frivolous
aggregate litigation, Rosenbaum argues that we must modify its application in
order to curtail its negative impact on critical litigation values such as access
to justice.4
As Rosenbaum works through her impressive normative argument, she
must necessarily weave together an atomized set of issues-state procedure
rules, federal procedure rules, RICO's adoption and subsequent use, the
Rules Enabling Act, federalism, aggregate litigation, and litigation values. Like
any great scholar, however, Rosenbaum knows the limits of her inquiry. For
example, there are potential structural solutions to the problem of frivolous
7. I have made a similar argument in the summary judgment context. See Brooke D.
Coleman, Summary Judgment: What We Think We Know Versus What We Ought To Know, 43
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 705, 725 (2012) ("[T]he real question is not so much about the efficiency or
fairness of the summary judgment process, but really just about one critical issue-the jury trial.
Regardless of what the data might tell us, the bottom line is that one either has great faith in the
value of the jury trial or one does not. And maybe that is where the debate about summary judgment
should start and end.").
8. Rosenbaum, supra note 1, at 168.
9. Id. at 220-21.
10. Id. at 184-87.
11. Id. at 187, 208-11.
12. Id. at 186-88, 204.
13. Id. at 201, 203-04 (noting that "[c]ivil RICO is an unusually potent weapon-the
litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device" (quoting Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d
41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991))).
14. Id. at 216-20.
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aggregate litigation that she acknowledges but does not cover exhaustively.15
Similarly, Rosenbaum recognizes that perceptions-largely negative-about
aggregate litigation abound even though we are often unsure if those
perceptions are reality. 6 More specifically, Rosenbaum notes that it is unclear
"[w]hether there is a problem with specious claiming in the mass tort context,
or more broadly in aggregate litigation."17
Even still, Rosenbaum feels compelled to admit that some mass-action
attorneys include frivolous claims among meritorious ones in an attempt to
obtain a larger settlementr-an empirical notion that she simultaneously
questions.19 She assumes as much, however, in order to reach her broader
point about why the RICO reprisal is a mistake and how that mistake can be
mitigated. Rosenbaum is not alone in taking this tact-literature on aggregate
litigation is rife with a recognition of its frailties.20 Yet, most of those
weaknesses are assessed using a potent combination of theoretical arguments
and anecdotal evidence. With a few exceptions, there is very little
comprehensive empirical study of the success and abuse of aggregate
litigation.2 Stated differently, we really do not know how much good or ill
results from this rather established litigation method.
I am by no means questioning the groundbreaking theoretical work
grappling with the challenges inherent in aggregate litigation. As Rosenbaum
explains, the tension that arises from lawyers' role as "fiduciary and
entrepreneur" has been thoughtfully addressed in the literature.22 Similarly,
15. Id. at 214 (discussing a series of proposed reforms to the various "flaws in aggregate
litigation devices").
16. Id. at 168-69.
17. Id. at 169.
18. Id. at 173 ("Unfortunately, improper conduct in litigation both in traditional two-party
actions and aggregate litigation-is not a new issue); id. at 215 ("Although over-aggregation is
indeed a problem requiring a remedy .. ").
19. Id. at 174 (describing the defense bar's criticism of aggregate litigation as not necessarily
established); id. at 213 (describing the potential abuses in aggregate litigation as due to structural
flaws in the aggregate litigation system, and not necessarily due to bad behavior or intent); id. at
171-72 (arguing that aggregate litigation "scholarship has largely gone the way of popular opinion,
often focusing on a smaller subset of ethical issues related to perceived egregious plaintiff lawyering
in aggregate cases").
20. See infra note 22.
21. See infra notes 32-37 and the accompanying text.
22. Rosenbaum, supra note 1, at 171. See generally, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLERETAL., CLASS
ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 370 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995); Richard A. Epstein, Class Actions: Aggregation,
Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475 (2003); Owen M. Fiss, The Political
Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 21 (1996); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance
and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337 (2000); Arthur R. Miller, Of
Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem", 92
2017]
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there is a breadt of engaging and important scholarship on the unique
challenges that certain kinds of aggregate litigation present.2 3 What is missing
is an understanding of the degree to which these tensions are problematic.
How much frivolous litigation is filed? And, how often do defendants settle
because they rationally fear aggregate litigation and its ability to consolidate
claims into a "bet-te-company" scenario? Finally, how much meritorious
litigation is chilled by the adoption of policies like the RICO reprisal or by
recent developments in the law like the restrictive approach to certification
taken by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes?24
If we are adopting policies like the RICO reprisal, it seems that we should
concretely understand and know the answers to these questions. The RICO
reprisal, like oter aggregate litigation reforms, is spurred by a sense that
attorneys file needless litigation. Yet, where policies such as the RICO reprisal
are adopted, one would hope that it is in response to someting more than
mere conjecture.
Thus, a return to my brief reflections on empirical work and aggregate
litigation.
First, there are a number of challenges to this kind of work. The
Administrative Office of the Courts, a bureaucracy that many scholars look to
for basic statistics, does not even track the number of class actions filed in
federal court.25 This makes it nearly impossible to develop a theory of class
HARv. L. REV. 664 (1979); Geoffrey P. Miller, Class Actions in the Gulf States: Empirical Analysis
of a Cultural Stereotype, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1681 (2000); Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence
Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2003); Richard A.
Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARv. L. REV.
747 (2002); Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71 (2003); Judith Resnik
et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, & Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
296 (1996); Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1991, at 5, 5-46; Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183
(1982); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision
of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as
Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998); Charles Silver, "We're Scared to Death":
Class Certification & Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003).
23. See generally, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 71 (2015) (assessing the repeat-player phenomenon in multidistrict litigation); Michael D.
Sant'Ambrogio & Adam Zimmerman, Inside the Agency Class Action, YALE L.J. (forthcoming
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2827187 (discussing a study of
agency class actions and procedures that have developed).
24. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349-52 (2011) (rejecting certification
of a class of women alleging employment discrimination, in part, because of a determination that
the women did not meet Rule 23's commonality standard).
25. See Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary--June 2016, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary-june-2016 (last updated June 30, 2016) (tracking
litigation by nature of suit and other metrics, but not by class action or multidistrict litigation). The
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation provides statistics on its cases, but it does not disaggregate the
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action filing trends. While scholars generally agree that-over time-class
action filing rates in federal court have varied, we are not altogether sure of
the magnitude of that change. In other words, the lack of even the most basic
data on class actions presents a huge challenge to doing empirical work.
6
With respect to multidistrict litigation, the black box is even more
pronounced. For example, when class actions settle, the court assesses the
settlement terms for fairness.27 In multidistrict non-class litigation, however,
thejudge is not required to undertake any review of settlement agreements.8
There is almost universal agreement hat settlement rates in all aspects of civil
litigation have increased-another empirical question that is somewhat
unsettled29-yet, there is similarly universal agreement that when settlements
are private, there is no way to know what values and objectives were used to
resolve the claim.3o When a class action settles, a court's evaluation pulls back
the curtain on some of these issues and provides good insight.31 That insight
is completely lost in the context of some multidistrict litigation, leaving critical
empirical information in the dark.
This is not to say that-in the face of these challenges-valuable
empirical work on aggregate litigation is not being done. Deborah Hensler is
information finely to provide a sense of class action filing rates versus individual cases that are
consolidated. See Statistical Information, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG.,
http://www.jpml.
uscourts.gov/statistics-info (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
26. Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REv. 78, 147 (2011) (noting that only limited data is
available about class-action litigation); see also HENSLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 51 n.52 (2000)
(discussing the absence of comprehensive data on class actions in both state and federal courts).
27. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e)(2) ("If the proposal would bind class members, the court may
approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.").
28. See Burch, supra note 23, at 116-17 ("[N]onclass settlements like those in Guidant,
Zyprexa, Vioxx, and the World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation are private agreements that parties
presumably enter voluntarily. Thus, the existence of a legal basis for policing a 'voluntary' settlement
between private parties is uncertain at best." (footnotes omitted)). A number of courts have, however,
still found ways to review a multidistrict non-class litigation settlement. Id. at 117-18.
29. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 525 (1991) ('While it is true that most civil suits are settled,
the figure is nowhere near the 90 to 95 percent figure that has passed into procedure folklore, and
is more likely in the neighborhood of 60 to 70 percent.").
30. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (discussing
the public cost of private settlement).
31. Although, even then, getting good information about how a class action settlement
actually works after a judge's approval is a challenge. See Nicholas M. Pace & William B.
Rubenstein, How Transparent Are Class Action Outcomes ?: Empirical Research on the Availability
of Class Action Claims Data (RAND Inst. for Civ. just., Working Paper No. WR-599-IC, 2008),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/workingpapers/2008/RAND WR599.pdf
("[A] veil of secrecy can fall over class action litigation the moment the judge signs off on the
agreement and ultimately, little information is available about how many class members actually
received compensation and to what degree.").
2017]
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a notable leader in empirical research on this front.32 In addition, the Federal
Judicial Center has done important studies.33 Finally, other scholars are
entering the fold. For example, in Judging Multidistrict Litigation, Bet Burch
used a cross-section of multidistrict litigation cases to determine the impact of
repeat players.34 And, others like Bob Klonoff have surveyed case law in an
effort to unearth trends.35 Most recently, Klonoff surveyed a wide variety of
district and appellate court cases and made predictions about how parties will
respond on key issues like ascertainability and the use of statistical proof.36
Yet, when it comes to research on how aggregate litigation actually affects
settlement or whether there is a burgeoning set of frivolous cases being filed,
the empirical work is quite thin. Again, there are exceptions. For example, in
1996, a Federal Judicial Center study found that settlement rates for class
action cases were generally the same as in individual cases37 Yet, overall-
mostly because there is so little data on how aggregate litigation systemically
works-scholars cannot study some of the thornier questions. Thus, empirical
work is largely based on observations about the developing case law or is
focused on discrete issues that can actually be studied. In other words, we
know a lot less than we should.3s
This leads to my second point. While I believe that we should endeavor
to remove the barriers to doing empirical work on aggregate litigation, I am
skeptical that it would make a difference in our collective hearts and minds.
32. See Deborah Hensler: Biography, STAN. L. SCH.,
https://law.stanford.edu/directory/deborah-
hensler (last visited Mar. 20, 2017) (stating Deborah Hensler is the Judge John W. Ford Professor
of Dispute Resolution, and her "empirical research on dispute resolution, complex litigation, class
actions and mass tort liability has won international recognition").
33. See, e.g., Emery G. Lee Ill & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness
Act on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723,
1742 (2008) (discussing concerns over the Class Action Fairness Act's impact on civil rights
actions); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking
Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 92, 182 fig.2 (1996).
34. See generally Burch, supra note 23.
35. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions in the Year 2026: A Prognosis, 65 EMORY
L.J. 1569, 1571-72 (2016).
36. Id.
37. See Willging et al., supra note 33, at 92, 182 fig.2 (studying only four districts); see also
Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in Class Action Litigation:
What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 591, 645, 652-54 (2006) (finding, on
limited data, no differences in treatment of class actions between state and federal courts, and
observing that "[a]ttorney perceptions of judicial predispositions toward their clients' interests
show little or no relationship to the judicial rulings in the surveyed [state and federal class action]
cases").
38. See Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts,
Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 212 (1995) ("Despite
aggregate litigation's now major impact on the federal courts, relatively little systematic information
is currently gathered about that genre.").
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First, there are fundamentally different views about the value of aggregate
litigation.39 These differences will necessarily impact our ability to agree on
what this new, additional empirical evidence might demonstrate. Even now-
wit the limited information we have-studies are used to suit one's
fundamental views. For example, the Supreme Court has recently taken
certiorari in less class action cases.4o Klonoff argues that the Court might be
wary of defendants' rhetoric regarding the "blackmail pressure to settle" in
aggregate litigation41-an argument that Klonoff believes might be valid, but
one he also believes is largely overblown. Yet, we have no way of knowing
wheter the Court believes this rhetoric is overstated. The Court couldjust be
waiting for a better case with better facts. We also do not know wheter one
of the largest criticisms of aggregate litigation-te blackmail settlement
effect-is true, and further, we do not know wheter the Court believes it to
be true. One's sense of the value of aggregate litigation ecessarily colors how
one mightjudge even this small data point. It is hard to see how this tendency
would change, wheter we have better information or not.
Second, as Rosenbaum points out, our collective tolerance for frivolous
claims is largely behind the debates about aggregate litigation.42 She states,
"The goal of the civil justice system is not, and cannot be, to have a system
absolutely free of frivolous lawsuits."43 I think she is right, but it is not that
simple. The problem is that we do not agree on how much frivolous litigation
we are systemically willing to tolerate. Put differently, we do not agree on how
much meritorious litigation we are willing to forego in order to decrease the
number of frivolous cases overall.44
39. See Fiss, supra note 22, at 31 ("The individualistic values that the class action calls into
question are all pervasive features of our law, perhaps of all law, and, for good or bad, will always
exert a restraining influence on the great temptation of social reformers to create collective
instruments that might better serve their ends."); John Leubsdorf, Class Actions at the Cloverleaf,
39 ARIZ. L. REv. 453, 457 (1997) ("Distrust of the government led many in the 1960s and 1970s
to welcome the class action brought by the 'private attorney general' as an alternative. Now, the
conflicting values and the disbelief in a common good that fostered distrust of the government have
infected trust in class actions. Those who want to cut back government also want to cut back class
actions.").
40. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions I: A Respite from the Decline, 92 N.Y.U.
L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id =2881484.
41. Id. at 11-14.
42. Rosenbaum, supra note 1, at 217.
43. Id.
44. See Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REv. 501, 504
(2012) (1L]f it were the case that more restrictive procedural rules resulted in less frivolous
litigation, with only a slight loss in unique meritorious claims, a restrictive procedural regime may
make sense .... If it were determined, however, that a restrictive procedural regime filters out more
meritorious claims than what is ultimately beneficial to society-meaning that the claims being lost
are unique and not otherwise captured by successful litigation-then there is more room to
question a procedural regime that is guided by a restrictive ethos.").
2017]
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It is this conundrum that comes up squarely in aggregate litigation.
There are positive values to aggregate litigation-social change, aggregation
of small negative-value claims, and deterrence, to name a few. Yet, there are
negative aspects of the method-loss of individualism and perverse incentives
inherent in representative litigation. For myself-and for Rosenbaum, I
believe-tolerating a higher number of frivolous cases is an acceptable price
for the greater good aggregate litigation can achieve. Yet, ours is not the only
view. That difference alone prevents empirical evidence from doing much to
move people away from their deep-seated positions on the basic value of
aggregate litigation. In other words, aggregate litigation might just have to
say, "you either like me or you don't," and we might just have to accept that
polarity regardless of what the data might show.
So, where does this leave us? After all, garnering useful empirical
evidence-much like the RICO reprisal-is not the only challenge facing
aggregate litigation. For example, more and more cases are shunted into
private arbitration and often the ability to aggregate claims-even in
arbitration-is prohibited.45 All of this could lead one to be quite dubious of
aggregate litigation's future. From my perspective, however, the picture is not
quite that bleak. As long as lawyers innovate the way they are bound to do and
as long as scholars like Rosenbaum are paying attention, I am fairly
sanguine.46 I may not have the numbers and data to back up my rather rosy
view, but maybe, just maybe, that is beside the point.47
45. Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic
Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 300 (2014) (noting that recent Supreme Court cases "take away
access to the judicial system and the opportunity for class or aggregate arbitration from countless
consumers, employees, investors, and small businesses that lack any real bargaining ability and are
left subject to adhesive no-class arbitration clauses relating to a wide range of basic transactions
and societal amenities").
46. 1 am not alone in this assessment. See id. at 306 ("Uncharacteristically for those who
know my negative personality, I will be optimistic for a change and answer 'no.' As Mark Twain
might say, 'The reports of aggregate litigation's death are greatly exaggerated.' But, of course,
inevitably the landscape will continue to change, reformulate, and transmogrify." (footnote
omitted)); see also generally Klonoff, supra note 40.
47. This may not just be the case in the class action context, but in other areas of procedure
as well. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate over Twombly and lqbal, 68 STAN. L.
REV. 369 (2016) (concluding that even after assembling a comprehensive collection of data, "it
might not be possible to settle the controversy over Twiqbal's quality-filtering effects using
empirical evidence").
[Vol. 102:240
